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I. INTRODUCTION

The taxpayer rights movement has been a driving force of tax
legislation and administration for over a decade. It has produced
the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TBOR) in 1988,1 the Taxpayer Bill of
Rights 2 (TBOR2) in 1996,2 the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3 (TBOR3)
in 1998, 3 lesser statutory initiatives,' and an array of important

TBOR was included as Title VI, subtitle J, of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3730 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
2
Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
TBOR3 was included as Title III of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered
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administrative changes by the Service.5 While the future of the
movement can be debated, 6 it is clear that, for now, it remains a
force to be reckoned with in tax policy.7
This article advances a proposal to extend and complete one
thrust of the taxpayer rights movement - reforming joint-andseveral liability for federal taxes. The Internal Revenue Code
(Code) imposes such liability in a number of situations, of which
three are of principal importance: (1) liability of "responsible
persons" when trust-fund employment taxes are unpaid;8 (2)
liability of spouses who elect to file joint income tax returns; 9 and
(3) liability of transferees of property for the unpaid taxes of their
transferor.
Joint-and-several liability is an important, sometimes
indispensable, device to preserve the integrity of tax collection, but
it can lead to unfair results. Unfairness can arise when
disproportionate collection is effected from one of the liable parties
and that party lacks effective means to compel the other liable
parties to make appropriation contribution. Congress addressed
this problem, albeit in different ways, as to responsible person
liability in TBOR2' 0 and as to spousal liability in TBOR3." The

sections of 26 U.S.C.).
See, e.g., Taxpayer Browsing Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-35, 111 Stat. 1104 (1997)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
' See, e.g., Charles 0. Rossotti, ModernizingAmerica's Tax Agency, 83 TAX NOTES (TA)
1191 (1999) (describing administrative changes underway or recommended by the
Commissioner of the IRS).
' For one view, see Marvin A. Chirelstein, Taxes and Public Understanding,29 CONN.
L. REV. 9, 9 (1996), stating that public hostility to the income tax system - a fueling factor
in the taxpayer rights movement - "appears to go very deep at the present time and may
be irreversible."
The legislation including TBOR3 passed both chambers of Congress by overwhelming
majorities: 402 to 8 in the House and 96 to 2 in the Senate. Such a large consensus may not
rapidly disappear.
' The liability of such persons arises under § 6672 of the Code. The joint-and-several
character of such liability is settled under the case law. See infra notes 102-05 and
accompanying text.
The joint-and-several character of such liability is prescribed by statute. See I.R.C. §
'
6013(d)(3). See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
4

'"

"

See infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
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task, however, remains incomplete. Congress should now address
the unfairness problem in the transferee liability context.
The transferee liability rules are triggered when a person who
owes federal taxes transfers his or her assets to others without
paying those taxes. These rules allow the Internal Revenue
Service (Service), under certain circumstances, to seek such
payment from the transferees who received the assets. When
multiple transferees are present, the Service is not constrained to
collect strictly on a pro-rata basis. Instead, it may collect
disproportionately - indeed, it may collect exclusively from a
single transferee. I do not propose that the Service be prohibited
from engaging in disproportionate collection in multiple-transferee
cases. Rather, I submit that an effective "right of contribution"
remedy be enacted. This would allow the "selected" transferee to
surcharge the luckier transferees, thus spreading the burden fairly
among all the transferees.
Part II of this article describes transferee liability and explains
how unfairness can result from the principle of joint-and-several
liability in multiple-transferee cases.
Part III examines
alternative solutions to the problem, with particular emphasis on
the TBOR2 and TBOR3 precedents. It concludes that a reliable
right of contribution would be the best antidote to unfairness in
multiple-transferee cases. Part IV considers whether such a right
exists now. It concludes that neither federal law nor state law
currently provides satisfactory contribution remedies. Part V
proposes creation of a federal statutory right of contribution for
transferee liability cases and describes the appropriate elements
and complementary rules of such a right.
II. THE PROBLEM
The Code imposes joint-and-several liability in a number of
situations in addition to the three previously mentioned. These
include particular situations with respect to the income tax, 12 gift
12 See I.R.C. § 412(c)(11)(B) (multiemployer pension plans when employer is a member
of a controlled group).
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tax, 13 penalty excise taxes, 14 regular excise taxes, 5 and civil
penalties.' 6 As the case law develops, additional situations of
joint-and-several liability likely will materialize.17 However, in
terms of frequency of assertion and potential for unfairness, those
additional situations are less significant than the section 6672,
spousal, and transferee liability contexts. As noted, Congress has
addressed the unfairness problem with respect to section 6672
liability and spousal liability. This Part explains why the problem
needs attention with respect to transferee liability as well.
A.

Transferee Liability

Assume that Albert is validly indebted to Bernice as a result of
a commercial undertaking, tort litigation, or other obligation
imposed by law. Further assume that Albert transfers his assets
to someone else (presumably a related person) and lacks the
resources to pay his debt to Bernice. To safeguard the integrity of

13 See I.R.C. § 2513(d) (nontransferring spouse who consents to split gifts undertakes
joint-and-several liability for the entire gift tax liability of the transferring spouse for the
year as to which gifts are split).
See I.R.C. §§ 4912(d)(3) (tax on disqualifying lobbying expenditures); 4941(c)(1) (taxes
on self-dealing); 4944(d)(1) (taxes on investments which jeopardize charitable purpose);
4945(c)(1) (taxes on taxable expenditures by foundations); 495 1(c) (taxes on self-dealing);
4952(c) (taxes on taxable expenditures by § 501(c)(21) trusts); 4955(c)(1) (taxes on political
expenditures by § 501(c)(3) organizations); 4958(d)(1) (taxes on excess benefit transactions);
4971(e)(2) (taxes on failure to meet minimum funding standards); 4976(f)(1) (tax on
prohibited transactions).
15 See United States v. Wainer, 240 F.2d 595, 599 (7th Cir. 1957) (excise tax on distilled
spirits), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 815 (1957).
16 See I.R.C. §§ 6652(c)(4)(B) (failure to file information return or statement); 6715 (dyed
fuel used in taxable use).
17 For instance, I.R.C. section 3505 imposes secondary liability for unpaid employment
taxes on lenders and sureties under certain circumstances. If there are multiple lenders
or sureties, it could be argued forcefully that they should be jointly and severally liable.
However, this issue has not yet been settled by the case law. See In re Ace Fin. Co., 59 B.R.
667 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (this issue is potentially present on the facts but not
addressed).
A bar group, while supporting the establishment of a § 6672 contribution or right,
opposed the creation of a contribution right with respect to § 3505 liability. See Committee
on Personal Income Taxation, Proposal to Create a Federal Right of ContributionAmong
"ResponsiblePersons" under Section 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code, 47 REC. ASS'N B.
CITY N.Y. 306, 311 n.22 (1992). This presupposes that § 3505 liability is joint and several.

"
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business and legal arrangements, a legal system must develop
remedies against such circumventions. The non-tax law for
centuries has had such features as: (1) fraudulent conveyance
statutes; (2) bulk sales acts; (3) corporation laws dealing with the
effect of mergers, consolidations, and liquidations on unpaid
corporate debts; and (4) rules dealing with creditors' rights as to
insurance policies. 8
An equal necessity exists for finding ways to prevent asset
transfers from defeating the collection of taxes owed to the federal
government. From the earliest days of federal taxation, the
revenue authority has had remedies against such transfers.19 In
contemporary practice, the devices available to the Service include
special liens on property transferred to donees, heirs, and legatees
in support of the gift tax and estate tax;2 ° the ability to sue under
either federal2 1 or state2 2 fraudulent conveyance law to invalidate
the transfer (thus returning the property to the transferor
whereupon it will be seized by the Service); and levying on the
property directly when it can be shown that the transferee is a
mere alter ego of the transferor,2 3 or is holding the property for the
transferor as a nominee.24
Frequently, however, the Service proceeds under an alternative
remedy - transferee liability. 25 If successful, the Service can
See, e.g., MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 9117.01 (1991).
19 For discussion of such remedies, see WILLIAM D. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL TAX COLLECTIONS,
18

LIENS, AND LEVIES 9118.02 (1995).
2
See I.R.C. §§ 6324(a)(2) and 6324(b).
21 The federal government enacted a fraudulent conveyance statute in 1990. Federal
Debt Collection Procedures Act, included as Title XXXVI of the Crime Control Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789, 4933 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28

U.S.C.).
2
These are of ancient device, originally modeled on an English statute: the Statute of
13 Elizabeth, ch. 5 (1571). More modernly, see Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 1,
7A U.L.A. 6 (1999); Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 7A U.L.A. 266 (1999).
' See, e.g., G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 350-51 (1977); Avco Delta
Corp. Canada Ltd. v. United States, 540 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1040 (1977).
2
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 581 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Gordon v.
United States, 649 F.2d 837 (Cl. Ct. 1981).
2
For discussions of transferee liability, see generally Jerome Borison, Comment, Section
6901: Transferee Liability, 30 TAX LAw. 433 (1977); and Ronald S. Rizzo, Transferee
Liability, 21 TAX LAw. 223 (1967).
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collect from the transferee, the transferor's unpaid taxes" up to
the value of the assets transferred to that transferee plus
interest.2 7 To successfully invoke transferee liability, the Service
must comply with the procedural requirements of section 690128
and also establish that some substantive ground of liability
exists.2 9 That substantive basis may be either an "at law"30 or an
"in equity"31 theory. In the great majority of cases, the Service
proceeds "in equity," under an applicable fraudulent conveyance
statute. Given the former absence of a federal fraudulent
conveyance statute, substantive transferee liability was previously
considered a matter of state law.32 Since the enactment of the
Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act in 1990, 33 a federal basis

2
The transferor's liability includes any amount shown on a return and any deficiency
or underpayment. See I.R.C. § 6901(b). Unpaid taxes for both the year of transfer and
preceding years are subject to this rule, regardless of when they are assessed. See, e.g.,
Yagoda v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 485,492 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 842 (1964).
Interest and penalties, as well as the principal amount of tax due, are collectible. See, e.g.,
Ruderman v. United States, 355 F.2d 995, 998 (2d Cir. 1966) (addressing penalties);
Robinette v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 285, 288 (6th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 745
(1944) (addressing interest).
" See, e.g., Benoit v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 485,493 (1st Cir. 1956); Pallister v. United
States, 182 F. Supp. 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
2
Section 6901 sets out procedural rules to govern two distinct types of secondary
liability. In addition to transferee liability, the § 6901 rules apply to fiduciary liability, i.e.,
cases in which the Service asserts that fiduciaries are personally liable because they paid
or distributed to others with lower priority instead of paying federal tax liabilities. See, e.g.,
Grieb v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 156, 161-69 (1961). For a comparison of transferee and
fiduciary liability, see Douglas Kniskern, When Will Transferees and Executors Be
PersonablyLiable for Estateand Gift Taxes?, 14 ESTATE PLANNING 106 (1987). Also, § 6902
sets out additional procedural rules for transferee and fiduciary liability cases.
2
It is settled that § 6901 is procedural only. To prevail, the Service must locate some
rule of law, external to § 6901, under which the transferee is made liable for the unpaid
taxes of the transferor. If such a basis of substantive liability exists, the procedures under
which that liability is asserted are given by § 6901. See Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39,
42 (1958).
' Either a contract under which one agrees to be liable for the debts of another or a
federal or state statute that imposes such liability. See, e.g., Sample Furniture Shops v.
Commissioner, 123 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1941).
"
Pursuant to a fraudulent conveyance statute. See generally ELLIOTT, supra note 19,
18.05.
32 See Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39, 45 (1958).
" See Federal Debt Collections Procedures Act, supranote 21.
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of substantive liability is available to the Service in virtually every
case.

34

Early on, the courts considered how the Service could collect in
situations in which the tax debtor transferred assets to multiple
transferees. The issue reached the Supreme Court in 1931 in
Phillipsv. Commissioner.31 In that case, a corporation distributed
all its assets to its shareholders then dissolved, all within a single
year, 1919. Subsequently, the Service3" assessed income and
profits tax deficiencies against the corporation for its 1918 and
1919 tax years. After collecting a small part of the assessments,
the Service notified Phillips, a 25% shareholder of the corporation,
that it intended to collect the entire balance from him. The Service
sent no notices to, and instituted no suits or collection proceedings
against, the other shareholder-transferees."
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Brandeis, the
Supreme Court emphatically affirmed the right of the Service to
collect all of the corporation's unpaid tax liability from a single
shareholder:
One who receives corporate assets upon dissolution
is severally liable, to the extent of assets received,
for the payment of taxes of the corporation ...
[T]he government is not required, in collecting its
revenue, to marshal the assets of a dissolved
corporation so as to adjust the rights of the various
stockholders. There is nothing in section 28038 to
indicate that Congress intended to limit the
See, e.g., Selbe v. United States, 912 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Va. 1995). The federal
fraudulent conveyance statute does not limit other remedies available to the government.
See 28 U.S.C.§ 3003(b)(1); see also United States v. Maryans, 73 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 94-2064,
at 94-2066 (N.D. Ind. 1994); United States v. Carney, 796 F. Supp. 700,703 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
Thus, the government sometimes asserts federal and state fraudulent conveyance laws in
the alternative.
283 U.S. 589 (1931).
Actually, the Internal Revenue Board, the predecessor of the IRS.
37

Id. at 591-92.

' Section 280 of the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 61. Section 280 was later
codified as § 311 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which evolved into § 6901 of the
present Code.
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[transferee liability] procedure in this way. And any
such requirement would seriously impair the
efficiency of the summary method provided. 9
This is the settled rule. After Phillips, both the Supreme
Court4 ° and lower federal courts 41 have emphasized that multiple
transferees are jointly and severally liable for the unpaid taxes of
the transferor. Concomitantly, the Service is not required to join
any of the other transferees to an action brought against one of
them;4 2 the sued transferee cannot implead or otherwise add the
other transferees to the suit;4 3 and the government is not bound by
any agreements among the transferees as to how liability will be
apportioned among them."
B.

Unfairness in Multiple-Transferee Cases

Unless its impact is cushioned by some other rule, joint and
several liability among transferees can produce unfairness when
assets have been disbursed to multiple transferees. For example,
Tad Taxdebtor, who holds $180,000 in assets, owes the federal

283 U.S. at 603-04.
' See Phillips-Jones Corp. v. Parmley, 302 U.S. 233, 236 (1937).
,1 See, e.g., Davis v. Birdsong, 275 F.2d 113, 117 (5th Cir. 1960); Benoit v. Commissioner,
238 F.2d 485,493 (1st Cir. 1956); United States v. Lansing, 272 F. Supp. 170, 175 (N.D. Cal.
1967); Drew v. United States, 367 F.2d 828, 833 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Estate of Cury v.
Commissioner, 23 T.C. 305,339 (1954); Quirk v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 709, 715-16 (1951),
affdper curiam, 196 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1952); Mann v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. 342, 344
(1976), affd without opinion, 546 F.2d 414 (1st Cir. 1976); Newsome v. Commissioner, 35
T.C.M. 335, 337 (1976); Foster v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. 1143, 1147 (1967); Richardson
v. Commissioner, 17 T.C.M. 297,299 (1958), remandedon other grounds, 264 F.2d 400 (4th
Cir. 1959).
2 See Phillips-Jones Corp., 302 U.S. at 236; see also Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S.
at 603, 604 n.16 (citing cases).
See, e.g., Ringer v. United States, 153 F.R.D. 594 (N.D. Tex. 1993); DiBenedetto v.
United States, 1974 WL 791, at *4 (D.R.I. 1974); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Tucson v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C. 1006, 1013 (1962).
" See, e.g., Bellin v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 676, 686 (1975); Alexander v. Commissioner,
61 T.C. 278, 295 (1973); Estate ofGlass v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 543, 575 (1970), affd, 453
F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1972); Estate of Cury v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 305, 339 ("[Transferee]
liability cannot be contracted away. The rights of the various transferees inter sese are
irrelevant when transferee liability is asserted against one.of them.").
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government $60,000 in taxes, interest, and penalties. Rather than
pay his tax bill, Tad transfers all of the $180,000, in amounts of
$60,000 to each of his three children: Amy (who lives in Amarillo),
Barbara (who lives in Bakersfield), and Cicely (who lives in
Cincinnati), rendering Tad insolvent. 45 The Service agent working
Tad's case is stationed in Cincinnati, where Tad also lives. The
agent learns of the transfers, and finding it more convenient to
keep the case local than to broaden it to Texas and California, the
agent pursues only Cicely as a transferee.
Assuming the
predicates of transferee liability are present, the Service will be
successful. It will collect the full $60,000 from Cicely, taking all
she received, but leaving Amy and Barbara in undisturbed
possession of their windfalls. Because transferee liability is joint
and several, such an outcome would be entirely legal.4 6
This example is not fanciful. The Service has collected
disproportionately among multiple transferees in numerous
reported cases.4 7 Moreover, the reported cases do not fully index
this practice. Courts sometimes fail to note in their opinions
objections raised by transferees to disproportionate collection,48
presumably because the matter is too settled to require discussion.
And, of course, most transferee liability cases, like most cases
generally, are resolved short of litigation, whether by default by
the taxpayer, concession, or settlement. One may reasonably
41
Tad reasons that it would be better if the money remains in his family. He intends to
give his money to his children eventually, and he expects that gratitude and filial piety will
prompt his children to support him.
, "Although a theoretical right to a writ of mandamus may exist, as a practical matter
an administrative decision by the Service not to assess is unassailable by a taxpayer."
Stuart Levine & Peter Driscoll, Is There a Right of ContributionAmong Responsible
Persons?,78 J. TAX'N 30, 34 (1993).
"7 In addition to cases cited above, see, for example, Benoit v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 656,
667 (1955) (calling the Service's transferee target decision "somewhat puzzling"), rev'd &
remanded on other grounds, 238 F.2d 485 (1st Cir. 1956); Estate of Harrison v.
Commissioner, 16 T.C. 727, 731 (1951); Durkin v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. 1932, 1933-34
(1994); Hunt v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. 1508, 1509-10 (1988).
" For instance, such objections were raised in several of the cases in which the author
(before entering academia) was trial counsel for the Service, but the courts' opinions
resolved the cases in favor of the Service without addressing these objections. See Harper
v. United States, 769 F. Supp. 362 (M.D. Fla. 1991); see also Harper v. Commissioner, 65
T.C.M. 2216 (1993); LeBeau v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. 3177 (1992).
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assume that disproportionate collection occurs in many of the nonlitigated multiple-transferee cases.
As stated above, the disproportionate collection outcome in our
example would be entirely legal. This does not mean it would be
entirely satisfying. Although some might dismiss Cicely's plight
as a case of "easy come, easy go," many, including me, find the
result too harsh, indeed unfair. I support this conclusion both
theoretically and by consensus.
1. Theory
Fairness is one of the fundamental goals of our tax system.4 9
Of course, fairness is indeterminate in significant measure; what
is fair in a given situation has an "eye of the beholder" quality.5 °
Nonetheless, some aspects or criteria of tax fairness can be
articulated. Two widely accepted criteria are "horizontal equity"
and "vertical equity," meaning, respectively, that the tax system
should treat similarly situated taxpayers the same5 1 and
differently situated taxpayers differently.52
The essence of applying both horizontal and vertical equity is
elaboration, in the particular case, of relevant criteria - criteria
by which to decide whether persons are similarly or differently

49
See, e.g., JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY (5th ed. 1987); Joseph T. Sneed,
The CriteriaofFederalIncome Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567,568, 580 (1965) (identifying
equity as one of the "seven paramount purposes... by which the income tax structure as
a whole, as well as its individual parts, can be measured" and stating that it has been "more
powerful than other criteria in shaping the outlines of gross income").
' See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 Wisc. L.
REV. 1267, 1280-81.
51 Much of the theoretical elaboration of horizontal equity as a goal was performed by
Richard Musgrave. See, e.g., THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 160-61 (1959); Horizontal
Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'LTAX J. 113 (1990); ET, OTand SBT, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 3 (1976).
But see Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191 (1992); Louis
Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989)
(both criticizing Musgrave's work).
52 See, e.g., JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND
POLICY 22-25 (2d ed. 1999).
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situated and, if the latter, the degree of the difference(s) between
From that perspective, disproportionate
or among them.53
collection in multiple-transferee cases is likely to be unfair.
When multiple persons could be held liable as transferees, they
all have been gratuitously 4 enriched by the same transferor,
occasioning nonpayment of the same underlying tax liability. The
presumption should be that they are similarly situated and should
thus wind up contributing proportionally to satisfying the tax debt.
To justify disproportionate collection as fair, it would be necessary
to: (1) identify some criterion, relevant to tax collection and the
transferees' situations, that renders the transferees differently
situated; and (2) demonstrate that disproportionate collection is
likely to recognize and reflect that criterion. Neither of these
requisites is likely to be satisfied.
First, fairness norms generate no relevant principle of
difference among transferees. In fact they may confirm the
transferees' similarity. Dodge, Fleming, and Geier identify "four
commonly invoked norms of tax justice" whose dynamic tension
shapes fairness debate:5 5 (1) the equal-sacrifice principle, which
"would tax people in equal amounts and is premised on the idea
that persons benefit from government equally"; 6 (2) the benefit
principle, which "asserts that individuals should pay tax in
57
proportion to the varying benefits they receive from government";
(3) the standard-of-living principle, which "would tax people
according to their standard of living, as evidenced by their level of
personal consumption";5 8 and (4) the ability-to-pay principle, under
which persons should support the government "according to the
'a

See id. at 22-23. Some doubt the feasibility of such an enterprise. See, e.g., JOHN F.

WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx 56-59 (1985)

(concluding that, because the terms horizontal and vertical equity "have multiple meanings
and because they are applied to complex situations, it is virtually impossible to utilize them
as general norms that can be operationalized when policy choices need to be made").
Typically, ifa recipient gives full consideration for the assets received, she will not be
liable as a transferee. See, e.g., Kreps v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 1, 8 (2d Cir. 1965); United
States v. Floersch, 276 F.2d 714, 717 (10th Cir. 1960).
"5 DODGE ET AL., supra note 52, at 23 (emphasis deleted).
Id. (emphasis deleted).
51 Id. (emphasis deleted).
Id. at 24 (emphasis deleted).
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economic resources, including both current income and
accumulated wealth, under their control." 9
How do these four norms apply to our context? Both the equal
sacrifice principle and the benefit principle are limited as
explanatory devices. The former is compromised by the fact that,
beyond a basic level, people do not gain equally from government
- those with much to protect, for instance, gain more than those
with little to protect. 60 The latter explains measures like gasoline
excise taxes, highway and bridge tolls, and the like, but has little
to offer with respect to general taxes like the income, estate, and
gift taxes.6 '
Moreover, context needs to be taken into account when
applying these principles. As traditionally used, the equal sacrifice
and benefit principles advert to primary tax liability. In that
context, it makes sense to compare the benefit received from
government to the burden imposed in supporting government. In
the transferee liability context, however, the more immediate
benefit is that bestowed on the transferee by the transferor.
There, the relevant relationship is between benefit received from
the transferor and burden imposed in defraying the transferor's
liabilities.
Reformulated for context, therefore, the idea
underlying these principles supports proportionality in transferee
liability burden allocation.
The standard-of-living and ability-to-pay principles have their
principal play in the debate over whether consumption or income
should define the income tax base.62 But that issue relates to
primary tax liability. We are past that issue when dealing with
transferee liability; the Code has already answered the question of
how much tax the transferor should pay. When the Service

Id. (emphasis deleted).
See id. at 23.
6, See id. at 24 ("It would be virtually impossible.. . to determine accurately how much
benefit particular individuals receive in cases where they are not the direct objects of the
government activity.").
-2 See, e.g., HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 18-19 (1938); Martin J.
McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easingthe Case for Progressive
Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 65 (1998).
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successfully asserts transferee liability, it is the transferor's
liabilities that are being collected out of (or based on) what
originally were the transferor's assets. Had the transferor used
them as he should have, to pay his tax debts, those assets never
would have reached the transferees. Some may argue that we can
rationally distinguish among transferees based on how much total
wealth they possess, but the fact that transferee liability is
posterior to the level at which standard-of-living and ability-to-pay
63
typically are discussed would undercut such an argument.
Thus, these traditional four norms do not provide useful
yardsticks by which to measure differences among transferees in
order to justify, on fairness grounds, differing treatment between
or among the transferees. Perhaps, though, there are other
criteria, more situationally relevant to the transferee liability
context, that could serve to distinguish transferees from each
other, thus justifying disproportionate collection outcomes. One
candidate is culpability. For example, if one of the transferees
planned or conspired with the transferor, or facilitated the
transfers more than the other transferees did, that would be a
reason why the one and the others are differently situated. And,
that reason would be topically relevant: the transferee's
wrongdoing delayed collection of taxes and forced the Service into
the additional expenses of pursuing its transferee remedy.
However, on closer analysis, this culpability criterion is less
promising. First, not all transfer situations are nefarious;
sometimes none of the transferees will have a "guilty mind." 4
Second, when such wrongdoing is present, it often will be
Transposing such principles of primary liability to the secondary liability context would
involve at least some tension with the case law. See, e.g., Estate of Cury v. Commissioner,
23 T.C. 305, 339 (1954) (rejecting the propositions that the amount of transferee liability
should depend on what the transferees did with the assets received or on how much they
got when they sold them).
" When asserting liability "in equity," the Service may argue either actual fraud (the
transferor actually intended, through the transfers, to defeat her creditors) or constructive
fraud (irrespective of intent, the transfers had the effect of rendering the transferor
financially incapable of paying her creditors). See, e.g., ELLIoPrr, supra note 19, 1 17.04[1].
The Service often relies primarily on the constructive fraud theory. See, e.g., Don v.
Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. 565 (1971). If the transferor did not have a "guilty mind,"
presumably the transferees did not either.
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generalized among the transferees, giving little or no ground for
differentiation.
Third, experience under state law is not
promising. Some states condition indemnity or contribution
among joint tortfeasors on their respective degrees of fault,65 but
this approach has proved to be "of limited value," in part because
"the distinctions are too vague" and are not easily applied in actual
cases. 66
In sum, the results that would be produced by
distinguishing among transferees on the basis of fault probably are
not worth the effort and expense that fact-finding on the issue
would entail.
Thus, we have the first reason why transferees should be
viewed as similarly situated among themselves, rather than
differently situated. Possible applicable norms either support
similar situation, or are of dubious applicability in the transferee
liability context, or just are not worth the candle to attempt to use
in actual cases.
There is a second, and at least equally powerful, reason. Even
if one believes that there can be relevant differences among
transferees, the present joint-and-several liability regime is
unlikely to recognize and implement them. Such liability means
that the Service may select among the transferees on any basis it
chooses. Typically, the Service will pursue first (and, if successful,
only) that transferee who is the most convenient target (as long as
he or she has collectible assets).6 7
Convenience includes things like having one's identity and
whereabouts known to the Service (it costs time and money to seek
out others) and proximity to the Service district working the case.6"
This approach is entirely sensible from the perspective of the
Service because it lowers administration costs. However, factors
"

See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
Ron Kilgard, Cleaning Up After Multiple Tortfeasors:Part Three: The Liability of
Multiple Tortfeasorsto Each Other, ARIz. Ary., Mar. 1999, at 38, 40.
Cf Committee on Personal Income Taxation, supranote 17, at 307, 313 (noting same
pattern as to collection of § 6672 liabilities).
' The Service is in the process of reorganizing and substituting functional for territorial
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Rossotti, supra note 5, at 1213-17. However, the proximity principle
will continue to determine Service behavior as long as particular officers handle particular
cases.
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so adventitious cannot support a claim that the present system
operates fairly. Visibility and proximity cannot be relevant criteria
on the basis of which transferees can be said to be differently
situated for fairness purposes.
The "as long as he or she has collectible assets" qualifier does
not improve matters much. At first blush, this sounds like an
"ability to pay" approach. But the Service, in asserting transferee
liability, does not rank-order the transferees by total wealth and
go after the richest first. It will pursue any readily accessible
transferee who has enough money and property to defray a
substantial portion of the transferor's unpaid taxes.69 This could
be the poorest of the transferees as easily as the richest of the
transferees.
In summary, it should be presumed that transferees are
similarly situated, thus proportional burden-sharing among them
is the fair result. A relevant criterion of distinction must exist to
justify treating the transferees as differently situated. No such
principle operates with force in our context. Even if it did, the
present system is not set up to implement such a principle; a
favorable result in this regard would be aleatory. Thus, from the
standpoint of tax theory, the disproportionate collection that
frequently occurs in multiple-transferee cases, is unfair.
2. Consensus
Theory is not the only aspect of the fairness inquiry. We have
noted that, conceptually, "fairness" is not well elaborated in the
tax context, perhaps inevitably. v Often, though, such theoretical
imprecision is undisturbing because, as a matter of the socially

This will include any transferee who retains an appreciable portion of the property
received from the transferor as well as any transferee who disposed of those assets but has
other assets. See, e.g., Estate of Cury v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 305, 339 (1954) (transferee
liability gives the Service a money judgment collectible from any of the transferee's assets;
thus, the fact that the transferee "promptly sold the assets thus transferred to [her] is an
immaterial consideration").
70 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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conditioned moral impulse, consensus exists as to whether a
particular state of affairs is fair or unfair."v
One can fairly say that a consensus exists that disproportionate
collection is unfair. In the transferee liability context, note the
view expressed in Phillips-JonesCorp. v. Parmley,v2 a sequel to the
seminal Phillipscase.7 3 In Phillips-JonesCorp., Justice Brandeis,
writing for a unanimous Court, remarked: "The injustice of
allowing [transferees not being pursued by the Service] to escape
contribution [when other transferees do pay the Service] is
obvious. " "'
Moreover, numerous subsequent decisions have
answered charges of the unfairness of disproportionate collection
by suggesting that the burdened transferee has a right of
contribution against the other transferees. v5 This may imply a
concern about unfairness if such rights are inadequate, as I
maintain they are.7 6
The consensus also emerges when one takes into account other
areas involving joint-and-several liability. One such area is state
tort law and the unfairness of joint-and-several liability there, if
77
unabated by some ameliorative doctrine, has been widely noted.
Closer to home is a provision enacted in 1996. The Code has long
provided that "responsible persons" are jointly and severally liable
for certain employment taxes not paid by their companies.7 8 In

71 As the saying goes,"I know it when I see it." See McCaffery, supra note 50, at 1280
(such conceptual imprecision "is not fatal to the use of equity in developing tax policy: many
of our most cherished social goals elude precise definition").
72 302 U.S. 233 (1937).
7' Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
See also supra notes 36-40 and
accompanying text.
7' 302 U.S. at 235.
7' See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
' See infra Part III.
See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 88 (1981);
Dobson v. Camden, 705 F.2d 759, 767 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'd on othergrounds, 725 F.2d 1003
(5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS at 337-38
(5th ed. 1984) (referring, in the torts context, to the "obvious lack of sense and justice in a
rule which permits the entire burden of a loss... to be shouldered onto one [unintentional
tortfeasorl alone, according to the accident of a successful levy of execution, [or] .. .the
plaintiffs whim or spite ...while the [other tortfeasor] goes scot free.") (citations omitted);
Kilgard, supra note 66, at 38 (referring to "the obvious unfairness of that harsh doctrine").
7' See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
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TBOR2, Congress created a new federal statutory right of
contribution for cases in which such liability is asserted
79
disproportionately among multiple responsible persons.
Congress took this step expressly because it believed
unameliorated disproportionality to be unfair.8 °
In summary, joint-and-several transferee liability is a
necessary device of tax administration, but the disproportionate
burdens it often imposes compromise fairness in taxation. In Part
III of this article, we explore how that problem is best addressed.
III. DESIRABILITY OF A RELIABLE CONTRIBUTION REMEDY
Conceptually, there are three possible responses to the
unfairness problem identified in Part II: (1) prohibiting the Service
from effecting disproportionate collection; (2) affording a right of
indemnity; or (3) affording a right of contribution. An indemnity
right or a contribution right could be sourced in either federal or
state law, in either statute or common law. In my view, a
statutory contribution right is the best of these alternatives.
A.

Undesirabilityof Proportionate-CollectionAlternative

In theory, the Service could be prohibited from effecting more
than proportionate collection from any transferee. In our example,
the Service could be permitted to collect no more than $20,000
from each of Amy, Barbara, and Cicely. A comparable approach
has been taken by many states in the tort context. 8'
7' See I.R.C. § 6672(d).
See H. R. Rep. No. 506, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 40 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1143, 1163 (1996) ("It would accordingly promote fairness in the
administration of the tax laws to establish a right of contribution among multiple
responsible parties."). Before TBOR2, commentators had taken the same view. See Levine
& Driscoll, supra note 46, at 30; Committee on Personal Income Taxation, supra note 17,
at 310, 313 (stating that "it could be considered irrational to allow the burden of the tax to
fall, through fortuitous circumstances, on just one person.").
"i Most states have abrogated joint-and-several liability in many or most tort contexts,
applying instead a form of several liability in which damages are apportioned among the
defendants based on their percentage of the total fault. See Note, Alabama's Wrongful
Death Act: A Time for Change, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 617, 617 (1998); see also John J.
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In addition, there is precedent in taxpayer rights legislation for
limitations on collection. Married taxpayers may elect to file joint
income tax returns,8 2 reducing the tax rates imposed on their
income.83 In return for this privilege, the spouses become jointly
and severally liable for the tax reported on the return, plus any
deficiency, interest, and penalties with respect thereto.84
Perceiving, however, that such liability can produce inequity in
particular cases,85 Congress has, since 1971,86 provided some type
the particulars of such relief have varied over
of relief, although
87
the years.
Congress substantially revised these relief rules in TBOR3.8 8
The new relief rules contain three main portions:8 9 (1) divorced or
separated taxpayers may elect to separate their liabilities;9 ° (2) all
taxpayers, whether or not still married, may attempt to qualify for
relief under a liberalized version of pre-TBOR3 § 6013(e);9 1 and (3)
all taxpayers may be considered for equitable relief within the
discretion of the Service.9 2

Lynch, et al., Third-Party Practice - Contribution and Indemnity, I ILLINOIS CMIL
PRACTICE § 10.2 (1997) (describing that change in one state).
8
See I.R.C. § 6013(a).
Married-filing-jointly rates are lower than married-filing-separately rates, compare
I.R.C. § 1(a) with § 1(d), although statutory income thresholds for deductions and credits,
combined with unusual expenditure patterns, occasionally make separate filing advisable.
Married taxpayers may do better or worse than single taxpayers depending on the incomes
of the partners. See Steve R. Johnson, TargetsMissed and Targets Hit:Critical Tax Studies
and Effective Tax Reform, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1771, 1777-78 (1998).
* See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3).
See S. Rep. No. 1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1971).
For the original provision, see Innocent Spouse Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, 84
Stat. 2063.
" For the version immediately preceding enactment of TBOR3, see former I.R.C. §
6013(e).
TBOR3 § 3201, codified at I.R.C. § 6015.
For discussion of these and associated procedural changes, see Jennifer A. Bourgoin,
"
Expanded Relieffrom Spousal Liability on Joint Returns:An Analysis of the New Innocent
Spouse Rules and Section 6015, 25 MICH. TAX LAw. 17 (1999); see also Toni Robinson &
Mary Ferrari, The New Innocent Spouse Provision: 'Reason and Law Walking Hand in
Hand'?, 80 TAX NOTES (TA) 835 (Aug. 17, 1998); R.S. Steinberg, New Law Expands
Innocent-Spouse Relief and CreatesElection, 61 PRACTICAL TAX STRATEGIES 280 (1998).
'o
See I.R.C. § 6015(c) and 6015(d).
91 See I.R.C. § 6015(b).
See I.R.C. § 6015(f).
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This scheme for relief from spousal liability bears relation to
our first alternative. A taxpayer qualifying for relief under any of
the above alternatives is absolved of liability in part or in whole the Service simply cannot collect the unpaid taxes from her. The
first alternative is particularly interesting for our purposes
because it is a proportionate liability regime.93
Nonetheless, the approach limiting the Service to only
proportionate collection would be an inferior answer to the
unfairness problem. As discussed in greater detail later,9 4 both
indemnity and contribution would continue the Service's present
ability to collect fully from one or some of the transferees.
However, they would, in different ways, allow the transferee
against whom disproportionate collection had been effected (the
Burdened Transferee) to seek recompense from the other
transferees (the Windfall Transferees).
Thus, in practical effect, there are two main differences
between the "proportionate collection" approach and the indemnity
and contribution approaches. One difference relates to the burden
of effort: who, the Service or the Burdened Transferee, should be
required to undertake the effort to find, and seek payment from,
the Windfall Transferees? The other difference relates to the risk
of noncollection: who - the Service or the Burdened Transferee should lose out when proportionate payment cannot be obtained
from one or some of the Windfall Transferees? The indemnity and
contribution approaches are superior to the proportionate
collection approach at both of these levels.
Transferors do not shower property on strangers. They know
their transferees; indeed, they usually are tied to them by blood,
marriage, intimate friendship, or a close business relationship.
Because circles of affinity tend to overlap, the transferees often

The electing former spouse's liability for any deficiency may not exceed "the portion
of such deficiency properly allocable to (her]." I.R.C. § 6015(c)(1). Under the allocation
rules in § 6015(d), "tax liability will be determined in much the same manner as if separate
returns had been filed." Marie B. Morris & Thomas B. Ripy, CRS Report Examines
Taxpayer Bill ofRights 3, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 21,1999) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file,
elec. cit. 1999 TNT 76-13, 1 35).
" See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
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know each other, usually in some non-casual way. Thus, the
Burdened Transferee often will be in a better position than the
Service to find the Windfall Transferees, and to determine whether
pursuing them is likely to be fruitful.95 Moreover, there may be a
greater chance of accord, of settlement and voluntary resolution,
when the discussion is between friends or relatives than between
transferee and the Service.9 6 On the odds, greater efficiency would
ensue by placing the onus of pursuing the Windfall Transferees on
the Burdened Transferee.
The case is even stronger at the second level. Assume in our
example, that, because of Barbara's insolvency or another reason,
none of her $20,000 share could be obtained her. Under the "only
proportionate collection" alternative, the Service would be "out"
the $20,000; under the contribution alternative, Amy would be.
The Service is a legitimate creditor; any part of Tad's liability that
goes unpaid will have to be defrayed, one way or another, by the
other taxpayers of the United States.9 7 Amy received a windfall;
if she loses part or all of it, she will be no worse off than before the
transfer. Thus, Amy, not the federal fisc, should bear the risk of
nonpayment by one or some of the transferees.
B. Preferabilityof Right of ContributionOver Right of
Indemnity
Contribution and indemnity are similar in that neither would
restrict Service collection efforts, but instead would have the
Burdened Transferee seek recourse against the Windfall

To supplement the Burdened Transferee's independent information, it would be
sensible to provide him or her access to IRS information as to the Windfall Transferees. See
infra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
"
Cf Committee on Personal Income Taxation, supra note 17, at 311 (suggesting that
existence of a § 6672 contribution right might lead responsible persons to negotiate among
themselves to apportion the total liability).
I
[U]nlike the ordinary tort or contract case, the other real party in interest [in a tax
controversy] is the taxpaying public. If the taxpayer gets off the hook for what he really
should be required to pay, the pockets of all have been depleted." Theodore Tannenwald,
Jr., Tax Court Trials:A View from the Bench, 59 A.B.A. J. 295, 295 (1973).
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Transferees.9"
They differ principally in the following two
respects:9 9 (1) a right of indemnity would permit the Burdened
Transferee to recover from other transferees all of his payment to
the Service, while a right of contribution would permit him to
recover only part of such payment;10 0 and (2) a right of contribution
would base recovery on ratios of amounts paid by the transferees
to the Service, while a right of indemnity would be triggered by
respective degrees of fault or by some other principle or difference
among the transferees.' 0 '
To illustrate a right of contribution in our example, the Service
would be permitted to collect from Amy the full $60,000 owed by
Tad, but Amy could then obtain $20,000 from Barbara and $20,000
from -Cicely, so that, at the end of the day, Tad's three equal
transferees would bear equally the burden of defraying his unpaid
taxes. To illustrate a right of indemnity, assume that Barbara had
conspired with Tad to set up the series of transfers in order to
defeat Service collection, but neither Amy nor Cicely had played a
role in such planning. Under a fault-based indemnity remedy,
Amy would be allowed to recover the full $60,000 from Barbara.
The entire burden of defraying Tad's unpaid taxes would be borne
by Barbara, none by either Amy or Cicely.
There are no close precedents for indemnification in joint-andseveral tax collection. There is precedent for contribution, as seen
in the employment tax regime.1 1 2 Under certain circumstances, so

I A formal legal remedy, such as a right of contribution or indemnity, is necessary only
if one or some of the Windfall Transferees refuse voluntarily to recompense the Burdened
Transferee.
But, given human nature, such refusal is not unheard of. See,
e.g.,Commissioner v. Switlik, 184 F.2d 299, 302 n.5 (3d Cir. 1950) (several transferees
agreed to bear the transferor's tax bill among themselves in proportion to the transfers they
received, but one of the transferees refused to participate in the agreement).
"
For discussion of differences between indemnity and contribution in the tort context,
see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 77, §§ 50-51.
" See, e.g., Highway Constr. Co. v. Moses, 483 F.2d 812, 817 (8th Cir. 1973); Skinner v.
Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ill. 1978) (citations omitted).
"0I Hybrid approaches also are possible. For instance, a right of contribution (part, not
full recovery) could be established in which percentages are calculated by reference to the
indemnity principle of degrees of fault among the transferees rather than the contribution
principle of amounts paid by them to the Service.
"2 See I.R.C. Subtitle C.
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called "responsible persons""0 3 can be secondarily liable under
section 6672 for employment taxes left unpaid by their company. 104
It is settled that the various responsible persons are jointly and
severally liable under section 6672.105
Concerned that
disproportionate collection of section 6672 liabilities would create
unfairness, Congress acted in TBOR2, providing that each person
paying under section 6672 "shall be entitled to recover from other
[responsible] persons . . .an amount equal to the excess of the
amount paid by such person over such person's proportionate
share of the penalty. ' °6
A right of contribution would be superior to a right of
indemnity as the solution to unfairness in multiple-transferee
cases. First, contribution would involve simpler fact-finding, thus
would be easier and less costly to apply in actual cases. To decide
whether contribution is appropriate and, if so, the appropriate
amount to be paid, one need look only at how much each of the
transferees has paid the Service. This is a simple determination
and presents few problems of proof.1 7 In contrast, the trigger of
an indemnity right would be the respective degrees of culpability
or bad conduct by the various transferees. This complicates
matters, since it0 8entails more contention, expense, and risk of
decisional error.
,01Such persons can include officers and employees of the company and others with
control over company affairs. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6671(b); Rev. Rul. 84-83, 1984-1 C.B. 264.
10'Such liability can exist as to the "trust fund" portion of employment taxes. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 7501(a); Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1978).
10 See, e.g., USLIFE Title Ins. Co. v. Harbison, 784 F.2d 1238, 1243 (5th Cir. 1986);
Spivak v. United States, 370 F.2d 612, 615 (2d Cir. 1967); cert. denied, 387 U.S. 908 (1967).
11 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 903, 110 Stat. 1452, 1466 (codified at
I.R.C. § 6672(d)). This right of contribution was buttressed by several ancillary provisions.
See infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
07 The easiest case would be when payments are made, or Service collection is effected,
in cash. Still, no real difficulty would be presented if the Service levied on non-cash
property pursuant to a transferee liability assessment. The rule already prevailing is that
the amount of the "payment" in such cases is the net amount the Service realizes from
selling the seized asset, not some other possible measure (such as the property's fair market
value). See I.R.C. § 6342(a). That same rule should be followed in computing the payments
that have been made to the Service by the various transferees.
106 Cf. Kilgard, supra note 66, at 40 (making this point as to state tort indemnity rules
based on distinctions between active and passive, reckless and negligent, initial cause and
continuing cause, direct and vicarious, and tort and contract).
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Second, contribution would provide more measured relief.
Under contribution, all the transferees would wind up bearing
some part of the burden of the transferor's unpaid taxes. This is
fair since each of the transferees received something from the
transferor. In contrast, indemnity is an all-or-nothing approach.
If the Burdened Transferee had 51% of the fault and the Windfall
Transferee only 49%, the indemnity action would fail and the
Burdened Transferee would be solely and entirely responsible to
the Service.. If these percentages were reversed, the Windfall
Transferee would be solely accountable. A right of contribution
provides a finer calibration of fairness, therefore is superior to a
right of indemnity.'0 9
In summary, the worst solution to unfairness in multipletransferee cases would be to constrain the Service to only
proportionate collection. Comparing the remaining possible
approaches, the better solution would be establishing an effective
right of contribution so that the transferee bearing the brunt of
Service collection could recover appropriate amounts from the
other transferees.
IV. INADEQUACY OF CURRENT CONTRIBUTION RIGHTS

Having concluded that a right of contribution best addresses
unfairness in the multiple-transferee context, we must determine
whether present law adequately provides for such a right. From
the start of the joint-and-several regime as to transferee liability,
judicial opinions have offered a ray of hope to Burdened
Transferees: the possibility that they may sue the other
transferees for contribution under "the general [non-tax] law.""0
Throughout the ensuing decades, the courts have continued to
repeat this solace."' Unfortunately, the ray of hope too often is a
Cf id. (observing that, if a state action for indemnity between joint tortfeasors is
successful, "all of the blame is shifted. One injustice is to a certain extent replaced by
another, albeit a lesser one.").
110Phillips-Jones Corp. v. Parmley, 302 U.S. 233, 236 (1937).
. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Switlik, 184 F.2d 299, 302 n.5 (3d Cir. 1950); United States
v. Genviva, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10433, at *8 n.7 (W.D. Pa. 1993); Benoit v.
109
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mirage."' Neither federal nor state law provides a reliable right
of contribution. In developing this conclusion, we will consider
general law, transferee liability cases, and an analogous body of
cases dealing with section 6672 liability.
A. FederalLaw
Federal law does not currently provide a right of contribution
in the multiple-transferee context. Whether federal law provides
a right of contribution has been considered by the courts in
numerous contexts," 3 and a reasonably clear analytical framework
has been established. The most important cases are Texas
Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.'1 4 and Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. TransportWorkers Union,"' both decided by the
Supreme Court in 1981.116 Under these and related cases, a right
of contribution exists under federal law only in three situations: (1)
if it is expressly provided for in a federal statute; (2) if Congress'
intent to create it can be "fairly . . .inferred" from a federal
statute; or (3) if it has "become a part of the federal common law
through the exercise of judicial power to fashion appropriate

Commissioner, 25 T.C. 656, 667 (1955), rev'd & remanded on other grounds, 238 F.2d 485
(1st Cir. 1956); Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 727, 731 (1951); Durkin v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. 1932, 1934 (1994).
112 The careful statement is that a Burdened Transferee may obtain contribution "if local
law or contractual rights justify such result." Estate of Curyv. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 305,
339 (1954) (emphasis added). Unfortunately, this predicate usually is absent.
"I Examples include: (1) Rule lOb-5 violations, see Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers
Ins., 508 U.S. 286 (1993); (2) antitrust, see Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451
U.S. 630 (1981); (3) Equal Pay Act and Title VII, see Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981); (4) admiralty, see Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling
& Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952); (5) Fair Labor Standards Act, see Herman v. RSR
Sec. Services, Ltd., 172 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1999); (6) bankruptcy automatic stay, see In re
Walker, 51 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 1995); (7) Section 1983, see Dobson v. Camden, 705 F.2d 759
(5th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); and (8)
Indian Arts and Crafts Act, see Ho-Chunk Nation v. J.C. Penny Co., Inc., 1999 WL 495899
1999).
(N.D. Ill.
114

451 U.S. 630 (1981).

451 U.S. 77 (1981).
I" For discussion of these cases, see Paul James Hunt, Bucking the Trend: An Argument
in Favorof a Fiduciary'sImplied Right to Contributionunder ERISA, 76 VA. L. REV. 1377,
1379-85 (1990).
115
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remedies for unlawful conduct."' 17
The first of these three bases clearly does not exist as to
transferee liability. Neither section 6901 nor related statutes 18
9 The other two
expressly provide for a right of contribution."
0
12
discussion.
detailed
bases require more
1. Statutory Implication
In testing for the second possible basis, the court's job is one of
statutory construction: determining whether Congress intended to
create the right of contribution.' 2' "Factors relevant to this inquiry
are the language of the statute itself, its legislative history, the
underlying purpose and structure of the statutory scheme, and the

"'
Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 90.
n" See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
Il
Although not a right of contribution, one may note the apportionment rules of I.R.C.
§§ 2205-2207B. These sections empower an executor to charge an appropriate share of
estate tax (and sometimes gift tax) against nonprobate assets included in the decedent's
gross estate, in specified circumstances. Typically, this power can be negated by the
decedent's will. If the will is silent and the above provisions do not apply, state law will
control apportionment of the estate tax burden. See, e.g., Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95
(1942). In effect, these sections "create a private 'right of recovery' as between the executor
...and certain beneficiaries so as to assure that these persons each bear an appropriate
portion of the taxes paid." Committee on Personal Income Taxation, supra note 17, at 312.
See generally United States v. Gilmore, 222 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1955); Jeromer v. United
States, 155 F. Supp. 851, 854-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
12 Although it is convenient to discuss statutory implication separately from federal
common law, there is analytical overlap between them. Thus, in actual cases, the two often
bleed together at the borders. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257,
2265-66 (1998); Atherton v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997); Henry J.
Friendly, In PraiseofErie -And of the New FederalCommon Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383,
411-17 (1964).
'2' See Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91 (citing cases). Similar principles apply as in
implied rights of action, the larger topic of which implied rights of contribution are a part.
See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 639. A substantial literature exists as to implied causes of
action. See, e.g., Gregory R. Mowe, FederalStatutes and Implied PrivateActions, 55 OR.
L. REV. 3 (1976); John E. Noyes, Implied Rights of Action and the Use and Misuse of
Precedent, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 145 (1987); Susan J. Stabile, The Role ofCongressionalIntent
in Determiningthe Existence of Implied PrivateRights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
861 (1996).
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likelihood that Congress intended to supersede or to supplement
existing state remedies."' 22 Each of these factors is adverse to
inferring a transferee right of contribution.
a. Statutory Language
The omission of contribution language from section 6901 and
other statutes is itself significant. 2 3 This is particularly so in light
of the fact that Congress has provided contribution rights in
another area of joint-and-several secondary tax liability - section
6672.124

An exception has been recognized when "the language of the
statutes indicates that they were enacted for the special benefit of
a class of which petitioner is a member." 125 This exception clearly
does not apply here. The intended beneficiary of the transferee
liability regime is the Service, its purpose is to assist the Service
to collect taxes owed by, but not collectible from, the transferor
herself. The Burdened Transferee is not within the intended class
26
of beneficiaries, as the very fact that she is Burdened shows. 1

12 Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91.

See id.
I.R.C. § 6672(d). A similar comparison was made by the Supreme Court in rejecting
an implied right of contribution in another context. See Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91
n.24 ("Thus, at least in these instances, when Congress wanted to. provide a right to
contribution, it did so expressly.").
"I Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91-92 (citing cases).
12 Cf. Lyon v. Campbell, 324 Md. 178,187 (1991) (making this point in noting that federal
law provides no right of contribution for § 6672 liability).
'

'2
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b. Legislative History
The ancestor of present section 6901 was enacted in 1926.127
The legislative history of the 1926 enactment 128 and the legislative
are barren of any reference
history of all subsequent amendments
29
to a right of contribution.
c.

Statutory Purpose and Structure

As noted above, the purpose of the transferee liability rules is
to help the Service, not transferees. The structure of section 6901
is also significant. That section and its associate, section 6902, set
out detailed rules governing the assertion of transferee liability.
The courts have repeatedly held that "[tihe presumption that a
remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when
Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme
including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement." 3 °
d. Relation to State Law
As noted in Part IV(B) below, some states provide contribution
remedies, although they are too spotty and unreliable to afford a
sufficient solution. Is it likely that Congress intended to supplant
or supplement those state remedies? On the historical record, the
answer is "no."
From the start, state law has loomed large in transferee
liability. "The Congress was aware of the use of state statutes [as
the substantive basis of liability] when the enactment of the

See supra note 38.
See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-30 (1926); H.R. Rep. No. 356, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess. 42-45 (1927).
2
Cf. Herman v. RSR Sec. Services Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 144 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting the
silence of the legislative history as a factor adverse to an implied right of contribution in
Fair Labor Standards Act case).
130 Northwest Airlines, 431 U.S. at 97; see, e.g., O'Melveny & Meyers v. Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 79, 85 (1994); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,458 (1974); Herman v. RSR Sec. Serv. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 143 (2d
Cir. 1999).
'2'
'
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predecessor section [to section 6901] was under consideration, for
the Congress in disclaiming any intention 'to define or change
existing liability' . . identified 'existing liability' as liability
ensuing 'by reason of the trust fund doctrine and various state
provisions.' 131
Indeed, in a landmark transferee liability case, the Supreme
Court held that, until Congress enacts applicable statutes, "the
existence and extent of [transferee] liability should be determined
by state law." 32 It remarked that "a federal decisional law in this
field displacing state statutes as determinative of [substantive]
liability would be a sharp break with the past." 33 In 1990,
Congress enacted a federal fraudulent conveyance statute, which
could serve as a federal basis of substantial transferee liability.
However, neither the statutory text nor the legislative history
suggests a desire to preempt use of state statutes. 134 It would be
hard to argue that Congress intended to supersede state law as to
contribution among transferees when Congress chose not to
supersede state law in the more fundamental matter of defining
the transferees' substantive liability.
2. Federal Common Law
The final chance for a federal right of contribution is "the
Wonderland of federal common law. " 13 5 We start by noting the
narrow expanse of that realm. The landmark case Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins declared: "There is no federal general common

Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39, 44 (1958) (quoting S. Rep. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st
Sess. 30 (1926) and H.R. Rep. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1927)).
S
Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39, 45 (1958).
Id. at 44.
See supra authorities cited in note 34.
'
Dobson v. Camden, 705 F.2d 759, 766 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 725 F.2d
1003 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
"'
"
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law." 36 Subsequent cases have continued to stress that the
authority to make federal common law exists only "in some limited
areas,"' 3v the instances of which are "few and restricted." 3 '
The limited instances fall into essentially two categories. One,
situations in which Congress has given the federal courts the
power to develop substantive law,'3 9 clearly does not apply to
transferee liability. The other, situations in which a federal rule
of decision is "necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,"'40
merits fuller discussion.
The Code rests on a congressional power expressly enumerated
in the Constitution 4 ' and, arguably, on pre-constitutional power
inherent in sovereignty. 142 Moreover, there is a legitimate federal
interest as to contribution. The Supreme Court has stated that
our "tax system [is] designed to ensure as far as possible that
similarly situated taxpayers pay the same tax," 43 and numerous
decisions have affirmed this value.'" Indeed, for three Justices,
this policy is so strong that they would have rested the substantive
basis for transferee liability in federal law, not state law, in order
to promote "uniformity in the imposition and collection of federal
13 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see, e.g,, O'Melveny & Meyers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 512

U.S. 79, 83 (1994).
1
Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc. 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1980).
13 Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651(1963); see also O'Melveny & Meyers, 512 U.S.
at 87 (1994); Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 95 ("[Flederal courts, unlike their state
counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction that have not been vested with open-ended
lawmaking powers."); Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966);
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 313 (1947).
13 See Wheeldin, 373 U.S. at 652. For instance, in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers
Ins., 508 U.S. 286 (1993), the Supreme Court held that defendants in an action under SEC
Rule lob-5 have a right to seek contribution as a matter of federal law. The key rationale
was that a private cause of action under Rule lob-5 was created by the courts, not by
Congress. "Having implied the underlying liability in the first place," the courts also had
common law authority to create a right of contribution. Id. at 292.
o Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964).
14 U.S. Const. art I, § 7, cl. 1.
12 See, e.g., Society for Say. v. Coite, 73 U.S. 594, 606 (1867); M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. 316, 431 (1819); United States v. Alberts, 55 F. Supp. 217, 220 (E.D. Wash., 1994).
1 Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 544 (1979).
'u
See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948); Burnet v. Harmel, 287
U.S. 103, 110 (1932); United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1941); Ogiony v.
Commissioner, 617 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1980) (Oakes, J., concurring); Bauman v. United
States, 106 F. Supp. 384, 388 (E.D. Mo. 1952).
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taxes" and to insure that persons are "treated equally without
regard to the fortuity of residence." 145 Given the great variation in
state contribution rules, 14 the same reasoning would support
federalizing the right of contribution in order to achieve
nationwide uniform treatment of transferees. Indeed, it was
precisely for this reason that Congress, in TBOR2, created a
47
federal right of contribution as to section 6672 liability.
There is force in these considerations. However, they fall short
of bringing us within the limited authority to make federal
common law necessary to protect a uniquely federal interest. This
authority exists "only in such narrow areas as those concerned
with the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and
international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States
148
or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases."
Even if the assertion of liability by the Service against the
transferees could be said to involve "the rights and obligations of
the United States," such rights and obligations clearly are not
involved when transferees seek contribution from each other. 149
The federal involvements and interests as to transferee liability
do not rise to the level of this narrow exception. Specifically, (1)
the fact that an Article I power is involved is insufficient; 50 (2) the
vesting in the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear transferee
liability cases is insufficient;' 5' (3) the fact that federal law is the
source of the transferees' joint-and-several liability is
" Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39, 48-49 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting, joined by
Warren, C.J., and Whitaker, J.).
' See infra Part IV(B).
147 See H.R. Rep. No. 506, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1996), reprinted in 4 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1143, 1163 (1966).
"
Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc. 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1980).
,9 Cf Ho-Chunk Nation v. J.C. Penny Co., Inc., No. 98-C3924, 1999 WL 495899, at *5
(N.D. Ill. July 2, 1999) (making similar point in rejecting a federal contribution right under
a statutory tort created by Congress).
" See, e.g., Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 641 ("nor does the existence of congressional
authority under Art. I mean that federal courts are free to develop a common law to govern
those areas until Congress acts."); cf In re Walker, 51 F.3d 562,567 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding
that another Art. I power, promulgation of uniform bankruptcy laws, does not create
common-law authority for a federal right of contribution).
"I' See, e.g., Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 640-41; Rice v. Pearce, 574 F. Supp. 23, 26 (S.D.
Iowa 1983).
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insufficient;1 52 and (4) the argument that contribution may
to the Service of its transferee liability
enhance the effectiveness
3
insufficient.1
is
remedy
Needless to say, against this background, generalized equity
Part II(B) showed that,
concerns are also insufficient.
unameliorated, disproportionate transferee collection is unfair, and
Part IV(B) will show that state contribution rules are an
insufficient amelioration. However, there is a long line of
authority indicating that such fairness arguments should be
addressed to Congress, not the courts, because of Congress'
advantage in weighing competing
authority and institutional
54
policy concerns. 1
Based on considerations like those above, "[in the absence of
legislation, courts exercising a common-law jurisdiction have
generally held that they cannot on their own initiative create an
enforceable right of contribution as between joint tortfeasors."'5 5
The same approach seems compelled with respect to a federal
common-law right of contribution among transferees.
3. Federal ContributionRight Under Section 6672
In Phillips-Jones Corp., Justice Brandeis, writing for the
Supreme Court, remarked that whatever right of contribution
exists for Burdened Transferees "arises under the general law."'5 6
In elaborating this concept, Phillips-JonesCorp. cited only a state
case. 157 Less than five months later, Justice Brandeis, again
writing for the Court, disclaimed the existence of any "federal

152 See, e.g., Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 646 (citing cases).
15 See, e.g., id. at 642. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., O'Melveny & Meyers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 79, 89 (1994);
Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 639, 646-47; Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 98 n.41; United
States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 511-13 (1954).
1
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285 (1952).
Phillips-Jones Corp. v. Parmley, 302 U.S. 233, 236 (1937).
151 See 302 U.S. at 237 (citing Richter v. Blasingame, 42 P. 1077 (Cal. 1895) (per curiam)
(right of contribution in favor of shareholder who had paid disproportionate share of his
corporation's liability for federal distilled spirits excise tax)).
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general common law."158 Thus, from an early date, there was
reason to think that whatever contribution right might exist did
not arise under federal law. In any event, after Phillips-Jones
Corp., there is a paucity of decided cases as to whether a federal
right of contribution exists with respect to transferee liability.
There are, however, many cases which consider whether, before
creation of the statutory right by TBOR2, a federal right of
contribution existed with respect to section 6672 liability. The
essentially universal view was that no such right existed. Scores
of cases supported this view,"5 9 and160only one unpersuasive district
court opinion was to the contrary.
One wishing to argue for a federal contribution right for
transferee liability might attempt to distinguish some of the
section 6672 cases. Some of these cases offered policy arguments,
including: (1) section 6672 is in the nature of a penalty and
allowing contribution would subvert its penal purpose; (2) section
6672 liability can be imposed only on those who "willfully" fail to
collect and pay over tax, and the equity courts traditionally are
reluctant to extend contribution in favor of intentional wrongdoers;
and (3) the possibility of being forced to bear 100% of the liability
might give responsible persons incentive to see that the taxes are
paid in the first place, an incentive that might be reduced by

permitting contribution. 161
These policy considerations operate with less force in the
transferee liability context. Transferee liability has never been
considered a penalty or penal in nature. No theory of substantive
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
See, e.g., McDermitt v. United States, 954 F.2d 1245, 1252 (6th Cir. 1981); Sinder v.
United States, 655 F.2d 729, 732 (6th Cir. 1981); Steffens v. United States, Civ. No. 3-941246, 1995 WL 459303 (D. Minn. May 19, 1995); Padalino v. United States, Civ. Nos. 881060, 88-3737, 1989 WL 154322, at *1-2 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 1989); In re All Star Sports, Inc.,
78 B.R. 281, 283-84 (Bankr. Nev. 1987).
" See Reid v. United States, 558 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Miss. 1983). The Reid opinion does
not cite, much less distinguish or criticize, the over half dozen prior decisions which held
that no federal right of contribution existed. See, e.g., Hanhauser v. United States, 85
F.R.D. 89, 92-93 (M.D. Pa. 1979); Geiger v. United States, Civ. No. HM76-1927, 1978 WL
1206 (D. Md. 1978); Cohen v. United States, 75-1 U.S.T.C. 9391 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
161 See, e.g., Rebelle v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 49, 51 (M.D. La. 1984); Cantlon v.
Ernce, 76-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9362 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
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liability, either at law or in equity, depends on the transferees
having a bad motive or engaging intentionally in wrongdoing.
Moreover, the incentive concern is weaker. Responsible persons
usually do not get anything from the company on account of the
unpaid taxes, so will "go negative" if they incur section 6672
liability. In general, however, transferees can incur no greater
liability than the value of what they received from the transferor.
They can lose the transferred assets, but they usually cannot "go
negative." 6 2
Presumably for this reason, transferees fear
transferee liability less than responsible persons fear section 6672
liability.
Despite possible attempts at distinguishment, the section 6672
case law does fortify the conviction that no federal right of
contribution exists for Burdened Transferees. I say this for both
legal and factual reasons.
a. Legally
Only some of the pre-TBOR2 section 6672 contribution cases
advanced policy arguments like those above. Even in cases
advancing them, the policy arguments were not essential to the
conclusion that no contribution right existed.
The proper
analytical framework does not involve policy arguments but
instead the principles established by Texas Industries and
NorthwestAirlines. These principles are the controlling law, and,
as shown, 6 3 their application clearly is adverse to finding a federal
right of contribution - either in the transferee liability context or
the pre-TBOR2 section 6672 context. The policy arguments are
interesting; they may even be reinforcing; but they are not
necessary. The Texas Industries/Northwest Airlines analysis is
clear, and it is controlling.6 4
Historical accident explains much here. The issue of whether
a federal right of contribution existed for section 6672 purposes

162

16

For exceptions, see infra note 174 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV(A).
For a well reasoned case in this regard, see In re Knapp, 124 B.R. 609 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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arose before 1981, the year in which Texas Industries and
Northwest Airlineswere decided. Absent the analytical framework
established by these cases, courts looked for other guides, relying
on policy factors as a result. The prime example of this is
DiBenedetto v. United States, 165 which is viewed as the "seminal
case" in this area.'6 6 Decided seven years before Texas Industries
and Northwest Airlines, DiBenedetto looked (in part) to policy
considerations, and this pattern was carried over, vestigially, into
some of the later cases.
b. Factually
For
The above legal argument is, I think, dispositive.
to
which
extent
the
examining
worth
completeness, however, it is
the section 6672 cases actually are distinguishable, on the basis of
the above policy arguments, from the transferee context. In my
view, the arguments apply more strongly to section 6672 but are
Thus, any
not wholly foreign to transferee liability.
distinguishment of the section 6672 cases would be a matter of
degree, not of kind.
The first of the policy arguments described above is that section
6672 is a penalty and that contribution would compromise its
penal nature. It partakes somewhat of the flavor of the second
policy argument. Standing on its own, the first argument has little
weight. Although the word "penalty" appears in the statute, 167 the
nature of an imposition as a penalty or, alternatively, a tax, should
be determined by substance, not nomenclature. 168 True penalties
are imposed on top of the amount of the underlying tax, but it is
the policy of the Service to collect and keep, via section 6672, only
amounts up to the unpaid trust-fund employment taxes.169 Thus,
9503 (D.R.I. 1974).
See, e.g., Rebelle v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 49, 51 (M.D. La. 1984); Lyon v.
Campbell, 596 A.2d 1012, 1016 (Md. Ct. App. 1991).
16 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6672(a).
See, e.g., United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213,
'u
220-21 (1996).
16 See. e.g., Kelly v. Lethert, 362 F.2d 629, 633 (8th Cir. 1966). There appear to be no
16
'

75-1 U.S.T.C.
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both the Service1 7 ° and the majority of courts addressing the
matter 17 1 treat section 6672, and properly so, not as a penalty but
only as a device in aid of collection, a variety of secondary liability.
The significance of the second factor, as a way to distinguish
between section 6672 and transferee liability, also can be
overstated. Willfulness in the section 6672 context does not
require a showing of a bad purpose.' 7 2 Moreover, in at least some
situations, Burdened Transferees, like Burdened Responsible
Persons, will have hands too dirty to qualify for relief under an
equitable remedy like contribution. The easy cases will be those
in which the Burdened Transferee actively and knowingly assisted
the transferor in a program designed to defeat Service collection.
But other cases, too, might be seen by at least some courts as
involving insufficient manual purity. Some courts may even
disqualify transferees for merely accepting the
transfer with
173
debts.
tax
unpaid
of
existence
the
of
knowledge
It also is unclear how great the difference is between section
6672 and transferee liability in terms of the third policy argument
- incentive effects. The section 6672 cases making this argument
offer no empirical evidence that responsible persons actually do
take section 6672 risks into account in their decisionmaking, or
even that they are generally aware of section 6672's existence.
cases in which the § 6672 "penalty" has been imposed in addition to the unpaid tax.
170 See IRS Policy Statement P-5-60 (approved May 30, 1984). Reflecting this, the Service

has restyled § 6672. It used to be known as the "100% penalty," but "trust fund recovery
tax" is the moniker now favored in usage.
, ' See, e.g., Hartman v. United States, 538 F.2d 1336, 1340 (8th Cir. 1976); Botta v.
Scanlon, 314 F.2d 392, 393 (2d Cir. 1963); Feist v. United States, 607 F.2d 954, 957 (Ct. Cl.
1979).
172 See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 747, 754 (E.D. Mich. 1980). An
intentional or reckless disregard of the duty to pay trust fund taxes over to the Service
suffices, including ignoring an obvious and known risk that the taxes might not be remitted.
See, e.g., Teel v. United States, 529 F.2d 903, 905-06 (9th Cir. 1976). Mere negligence,
however, does not constitute willfulness. See, e.g., Bauer v. United States, 543 F.2d 142, 150
(Ct. Cl. 1976).
,13 Cf. Wynne v. Fischer, 809 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (in discussing the
concept of injury in the "clean hands" context for § 6672 contribution purposes, holding that
"[t]he payment of taxes is fundamental to the well-being of society. The severity of the
wrong committed [non-payment of tax negates any necessity for a showing of harm by [the
responsible officer against whom contribution is sought].").
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Since the argument is purely speculative, we may similarly
speculate about incentives in the transferee liability context. A
transferee can lose all she receives from the transferor if the
unpaid taxes are large enough. Moreover, the transferee may
ultimately suffer a net loss when interest 74 and attorney's fees are
considered. An incentive-effects differential likely exists between
the section 6672 and transferee liability contexts, but it is not
absolute.
In summary, under the four criteria of the prevailing Texas
Industries/Northwest Airlines standard, it is extremely difficult to
argue that federal law provides a transferee right of contribution.
The essentially unanimous decisions that pre-TBOR2 law provided
no federal contribution right under section 6672 further support
this view. An attempt to distinguish such case law would be only
partly convincing factually and flatly unconvincing legally.
B. State Law
Given the unavailability of a federal right of contribution for
Burdened Transferees, their relief, if any, must come under state
law. Although some Burdened Transferees may succeed, state
contribution law is not consistently reliable. It is an insufficient
antidote to the unfairness of disproportionate transferee collection.
Below, I survey the applicable law, then explain its inadequacy to
the task at hand.
1. The Law
Whether state law provides a transferee right of contribution
has been litigated a number of times. Although the existence of
such a right, either as a theoretical possibility or on the actual
facts of the case, sometimes has been declared, 175 many of the
As to the computation of interest, see supra ELLIOTT, note 19, 118.0613].
," See, e.g., Fillman v. United States, 90-2 U.S.T.C. 1 60,041 (S.D. Iowa 1990); cf
Soderberg v. Commissioner of Taxation, Nos. 1513-1518, 1971 WL 98 (Minn. Tax Ct. 1971)
(upholding contribution right with respect to transferee liability asserted by the state, not
the Service). But cf Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Anthony, 81 A.2d 191, 198 (N.J. Super. Ct.
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cases are old,176 and most American jurisdictions have yet to speak
authoritatively on the issue.
That being so, one may, by way of analogy, consider state
contribution case law in two other tax areas. First, contribution
rights sometimes have been discussed with regard to spousal
liability arising from joint income tax returns. Spouses paying
more than their share of such joint liabilities sometimes have
argued that (1) they had a state right of contribution from the
other spouse for the excess; (2) the other spouse was insolvent, so
the contribution right was worthless; therefore, (3) they are
entitled to "bad debt" deductions under section 166.177 As relevant
to our inquiry, some of the cases have held or assumed that
applicable state law does provide a right of contribution in
78
disproportionate spousal liability situations.
Second, many cases considered the availability of a state right
of contribution, pre-TBOR2, when disproportionate collection of
section 6672 liability occurred among responsible persons. While
some cases held in favor of such a right,'7 9 most held against it. 80
Although there is also an independent rationale for the "no right"

Ch. Div. 1951), affd, 86 A.2d 594 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952) (holding that donee who
paid donor's federal gift tax liability is not entitled to reimbursement by donor).
176 See, e.g., Richter v. Blasingame, 42 P. 1077 (Cal. 1895) (per curiam); Nebel v. Nebel,
28 S.E.2d 207 (N.C. 1943); In re Mellon Estate, 32 A.2d 749 (Pa. 1943).
See Rude v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 165 (1967); see also Haynes v. Commissioner, 27
T.C.M. 1531 (1968). Or, if the spouse who paid was deceased, her estate sometimes argued
for an estate tax deduction under § 2053(a). See infra note 178. There also has been
litigation of the following issue: when a shareholder-transferee pays tax liabilities of his
corporation-transferor, is his resultant income tax deduction ordinary or capital in nature?
See, e.g., Gersten v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 756, 768-69 (1957), affd in part& remanded in
part as to other issues, 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959).
"'6 See Johnson v. United States, 742 F.2d 137, 141-42 (4th Cir. 1984) (estate tax; Virginia
law); Estate of McClure v. United States, 288 F.2d 190, 192 (estate tax; Maryland law).
179 See, e.g., Swift v. Levesque, 614 F. Supp. 172, 176-77 (D. Conn. 1985) (finding this a
"close question" under Connecticut law); Goldhill v. Kramer, 176 S.E.2d 232, 234 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1970); Ardema v. Fitch, 684 N.E.2d 884,889 (111. App. Ct. 1997); Lyon v. Campbell, 596
A.2d 1012, 1017-18 (Md. 1991).
1 See, e.g., McDermitt v. United States, 954 F.2d 1245, 1252 (6th Cir. 1992) (Ohio law);
Wright v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C.
50,056 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Kamins v. Spyres, 540
P.2d 1208, 1212 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975); Wynne v. Fischer, 809 S.W.2d 264, 266-68 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1991).
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view,'
some of the "no right" decisions adverted to policy
arguments. 182 This raises the point discussed earlier as to whether
such section 6672 decisions are meaningfully distinguishable from
the transferee liability context.'83
2. The Problems
State contribution remedies are an inadequate solution to the
unfairness problem of disproportionate collection of transferee
liabilities for three reasons: (1) categorically, the availability of
such remedies is less than certain; (2) the remedies are nonuniform, undermining the horizontal equity of the tax system; and
(3) state procedures are cumbersome and uncertain when
transferees are scattered among various states.
a.

UncertainAvailability

As noted above, decisions as to state contribution rights for
transferees are not geographically comprehensive and, in some
instances, are superannuated. Thus, the very availability of such
rights should not be deemed secure on a general basis.
Analytically, a shortcoming of the jurisprudence to date has
been the failure to integrate section 6672 contribution cases and
transferee liability contribution cases. Although these cases have
proceeded on separate tracks, they are not conceptually discrete.
One of the rationales used to deny state contribution rights to
responsible persons should be considered in our context.
Congress expressly left room for state remedies under other
statutory schemes, such as Title VII section 1983 actions for
violations of civil rights. 8 4 It did not do so under section 6672 or,
our context, section 6901 and related sections. Thus, it has been
reasoned:

181 See infra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
182

See, e.g., Hanhauser v. United States, 85 F.R.D. 89, 92 (M.D. Pa. 1979).

"B

See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (implementational rules for § 1983 actions).

1
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If Congress intended for state law to provide a right
of contribution, it could have included a section
which allows state law remedies to fill gaps left by
the federal law as it did. . . for federal civil rights
actions.
.
.
.
Congress chose not to, and
accordingly, this Court holds that when a § 6672
remedy is sought, a party may not seek a state law
right to contribution.'8 5
Is this argument dispositive? No. Inference from congressional
silence is always tricky.'8 6 Although the underlying liabilities
arise from federal law, that does not inevitably mean that state
procedures are ousted, particularly after the federal government
has satisfied its revenue interest. Nonetheless, the argument
cannot be dismissed out of hand. It has been advanced by many
courts, both state courts and federal courts applying state law, as
a reason why state contribution remedies are unavailable in
disproportionate collection section 6672 cases.' 87 Testifying in
favor of the proposal enacted as part of TBOR2, the chair-elect of
the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Taxation told
Congress:
Unfortunately, state law does not always provide a
remedy. Even states that permit joint tortfeasors to
obtain contribution from one another do not permit
a right of contribution in Section 6672 cases. These
states believe that this is a Federal matter and
defer to the uniform rule in the Federal courts
against contribution by other responsible persons.' 88
Conley v. United States, 773 F. Supp. 1176, 1177 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
187 See, e.g., Cline v. United States, No. 89-CV-73312-DT, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11036
(E.D. Mich. 1991); Seachrist v. Riggs, 91-1 U.S.T.C. 1 50,019, at 87,097 (N.D. W. Va. 1990);
Marine Bank v. United States, 739 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (C.D. Ill. 1990); Rebelle v. United
States, 588 F. Supp. 49, 52 (M.D. La. 1984); DiBenedetto v. United States, Civ. No. 74-19,
1974 WL 791, at *2 (D.R.I. 1974); Plato v. State Bank, 555 N.W.2d 365, 366-68 (S.D. 1996);
Wynne v. Fischer, 809 S.W.2d 264, 266-68 (Tex. App. 1991).
Exploring the Development of Taxpayer Bill of Rights II Legislation: Hearing before
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This rationale is probably stronger in the transferee context
now than it was in the section 6672 context when those cases were
decided. In 1996, in TBOR2, Congress created a statutory right of
contribution for section 6672, a secondary liability tax mechanism.
This makes it harder to argue that its failure to create a similar
federal right for transferee liability cases, or to authorize recourse
outside of federal procedures to gap-filling state remedies, is the
product of mere congressional inattention or inadvertence.' 8 9 If the
above arguments are skillfully pressed by counsel, the availability
of state contribution rights for transferees will not be certain in
future litigation.
b. Lack of Uniformity
Given the hostility of the courts to contribution in section 6672
cases, Burdened Responsible Persons sometimes resorted to a
"grab bag" of alternative theories in their attempts to shift onto
other responsible persons all or part of the burden of Service
collection. Such theories included breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, accounting malpractice, unjust enrichment, fraud,
and suretyship.' 9° Such claims typically were unsuccessful, the

the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and Means, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. 167 (1995) (Statement of N. Jerold Cohen) [hereinafter Cohen]. To similar effect, see
Committee on Personal Income Taxation, supra note 17, at 308.
'" The significance of the TBOR2 change may not be lost on the courts. One state court
remarked that, via, TBOR2, "Congress has drastically changed the pre-existing court-made
federal policy in this regard." Lostocco v. D'Eramo, No. A99A0253, 1999 WL 330313, at *5
(Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
" See, e.g., Alten v. Ellin & Tucker, Chartered, 854 F. Supp. 283, 288 (D. Del. 1994);
United States v. Amerson, 808 F. Supp. 695 (W.D. Mo. 1992); Continental Illinois Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, No. 86 C 5335, 1987 WL 12206 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Spivak
v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 517, 524 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd, 370 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.
1967), cert.denied, 387 U.S. 908 (1967); In re Windsor Communications Group, Inc., 45 B.R.
770, 774-76 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985).
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courts seeing them as masked attempts to circumvent the "no
contribution" case law."' One court, in dicta, did seem to be
receptive, 192 but that case has been sharply criticized.19 a
The more exotic blooms having been culled from the garden,
Burdened Transferees' hopes for a state remedy rest squarely on
contribution remedies. Such remedies have developed in two
contexts: contribution among joint tortfeasors 9 4 and contribution
among joint obligors and others.1 95 Although now often codified,
contribution rights have their roots in equity and typically are
construed according to equitable principles.1 96
Diversity of approach is one of the benefits of reliance on state
regulation, 197 but such diversity can be a drawback too. We
previously identified the value of horizontal equity, the goal of
treating similarly situated persons similarly for tax purposes
regardless of where in the country they are located. We described
this as a legitimate federal interest, although it falls short of
authorizing a transferee
contribution right as a matter of federal
98
common law.1
Reliance on state law to supply a transferee with the right of
contribution would undercut this value. State contribution rules
vary greatly as to general availability, major requirements, and

191 See, e.g., Bellovin v. United States, 983 F. Supp. 344, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Alten v.
Ellin & Tucker, Chartered, 854 F. Supp. 283, 287-88 (D. Del. 1994); Continental Illinois
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, No. 86 C 5335, 1987 WL 12206, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
1987).
192 Garity v. United States, 80-1 U.S.T.C. $ 9407 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (memorandum
opinion).
1
See, e.g., Schoot v. United States, 664 F. Supp. 293, 297 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Rebelle v.
United States, 588 F. Supp. 49, 52 (M.D. La. 1984); Moats v. United States, 564 F. Supp.
1330, 1341 (W.D. Mo. 1983), affd sub nom. United States v. O'Crowley, 786 F.2d 1171 (8th
Cir. 1986).
...See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 77, § 50; Comment Note, Contribution
Between Negligent Tortfeasors at Common Law, 60 A.L.R.2d 1366 (1997).
See, e.g., Aardema v. Fitch, 684 N.E.2d 884, 889-90 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); In re Mellon
Estate, 32 A.2d 749, 756-57 (1943); Esstman v. Boyd, 605 S.W.2d 237, 241-42 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1979).
" See, e.g., Huggins v. Graves, 337 F.2d 486,489 (6th Cir. 1964); Ocean Accident & Guar.
Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 162 P.2d 609, 612 (Ariz. 1945).
"
This is the "laboratories of democracy" rationale for federalism.
'
See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
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There are some uniform laws as to
technical details.' 99
2 °0 Most states, however, have not adopted them, and
contribution.
some states have adopted only with variations.2 "
Consider some examples of non-uniformity.20 2 First, states
(now the minority) which follow the original common-law rule do
not permit contribution among joint tortfeasors; in other states,
persons can come within the ambit of a relief statute only by being
Second, many states will not compel
joint tortfeasors. °3
proportionality if the liable persons were not equally at fault or
otherwise were "not in equal right."20 4 Third, some states will not
enforce contribution unless an agreement or understanding to
share liabilities is found or implied.20 5
The mere existence of a cause of action for contribution in a
state does not, of course, mean that disproportionality can be
evened out. Even Phillips-Jones Corp., after referring to the
possibility of contribution, noted several generic requirements,
then added: "Every defendant may, of course, set up any defense
personal to him."20 6 The problem is that such requirements and
defenses vary, often substantially, among the states. Thus, a
Burdened Transferee in one state might succeed in obtaining
contribution even when an otherwise identically situated
Burdened Transferee in another state would not.
I As to contribution rules regardingjoint tortfeasors, "there is so much variation [among
the states] in the terms of the statutes, in decisions on issues not explicitly addressed by the
statutes, and even in the decisions in states having no statutes." PROSSER& KEETON, supra
note 77, at 338; see also Kilgard, supra note 66, at 43 ("[Ihe substantive law on multiple
tortfeasors varies so greatly from state to state"); Annotation, What Law Governs Right to
Contributionor Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 95 A.L.R.2d 1096, 1097 (1964).
"' UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT (1955 Revised Act), 12 U.L.A. 185
(1996); UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL JOINT OBLIGATIONS AcT (1925 Act).
"l See, e.g., Annotation, Uniform ContributionAmong TortfeasorsAct, 34 A.L.R.2d 1107,
1107-08 (1954 & Supp.).
' These are illustrative, not exhaustive. For additional discussion, see PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 77, at 338-41. In its project RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY, the American Law Institute identified five separate tracks
for the liability of multiple defendants. See Kilgard, supra note 66, at 43.
See, e.g., Swift v. Levesque, 614 F. Supp. 172, 175-76 (D. Conn. 1985).
' Cf Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 162 P.2d 609,
612 (Ariz. 1945).
' See, e.g., Proffv. Maley, 128 P.2d 330, 331 (Wash. 1942).
Phillips-Jones Corp. v. Parmley, 302 U.S. 233, 236 (1937).
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This lack of uniformity is unacceptable. In creating a federal
statutory contribution right under section 6672, Congress noted
that Burdened Responsible Persons had to "pursue [their] claims
for contribution under state law (to the extent state law permits
such claims). The variations in state law sometimes make it
difficult or impossible to press successful suits in state courts to
force a contribution from other responsible persons." °7 This same
perception should prompt Congress to create a federal statutory
contribution right for transferee liability.
c. Interstate Coordination
In most instances, the transferor and transferees live in the
same state. In our highly mobile society, however, there are times
when the relevant actors are scattered across state lines.2" 8 If the
transferees reside in two, three, or more states, in what forum
should the Burdened Transferee bring her contribution suit
against the Windfall Transferees?
A state tribunal might find it difficult to assert personal
jurisdiction over the out-of-state transferees. °9 What is the
jurisdictionally significant event: Where the transferor resided?
Where the transferred property was located? Where the transfer
is deemed to have occurred? Where the tax was paid to the
Service? Where the refusal to contribute occurred? And, assuming
that the jurisdictionally significant event is deemed to have
occurred in the forum jurisdiction, is the foreign Windfall
Transferee sufficiently connected to that jurisdiction so that a
210
constitutionally sufficient nexus exists?

21
H.R. Rep. No. 506, 10th Cong., 2d Sess. at 40 (1996), reprintedin 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163
(1996); see also Levine & Driscoll, supra note 46, at 30 ("The cases are extraordinarily
divergent both in approach and in result.").
For example, in one controversy in which the author was counsel for the Service, the
transferor and one of her transferees lived in Florida while the other transferee lived in
Virginia.
Ripley v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 654 (1994) (Florida case); Ripley v.
Commissioner, 105 T.C. 358 (1995) rev'd, 103 F.3d 332 (4th Cir.1996) (Virginia case).
' See generally Lea Brilmayer, Related Contactsand PersonalJurisdiction,101 HARV.
L. REV. 1444 (1988).
210 See generally JOHN J. COUND, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 65-177
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Bringing a contribution action based on state law in federal
court would not be an effective alternative. Subject-matter
jurisdiction would be hard to demonstrate. The cause of action
would sound in state, not federal law. The fact that federal tax
collection started the controversy would be insufficient to establish
either federal-question or supplemental jurisdiction. 211 Diversity
jurisdiction usually would be unavailable, either because of the
"complete diversity" rule2 12 or the $75,000 "amount in controversy"
threshold.213 The experience of section 6672 contribution litigation
suggests that the courts will apply such limits rigorously in order
to deny jurisdiction.2 1 4 In addition, federal litigation also would be
hobbled by limitations on personal jurisdiction.2 5
C. Summary
No fully satisfactory right of contribution currently exists for
disproportionate collection transferee liability cases. No transferee
right of contribution exists at the federal level. A number of
decisions have held that state contribution rights exist. However,
(1) most jurisdictions have not spoken authoritatively on the issue;
(2) analytically, it is less than certain that such rights exist; (3)
reliance on state remedies would invite non-uniform results,
eroding the horizontal equity of the tax system; and (4) state
remedies are cumbersome to apply in multi-state transferee
situations.

(6th ed. 1993). Similar sorts of questions might have to be asked in deciding which state's
law governs the case. See, e.g., Alten v. Ellin & Tucker, Chartered, 854 F. Supp. 283, 287
(D. Del. 1994) (choice-of-law issues in state contribution cases involving § 6672 liabilities);
cf Annotation, What Law GovernsRight to Contributionor Indemnity Between Tortfeasors,
95 A.L.R.2d 1096 (1997).
2" Cf Laub v. Ross, 818 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Carlucci v. United States, 793 F.
Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (rejecting jurisdiction over § 6672 state-law contribution claims;
considering, respectively, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367).
212 See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941).
211 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
211 See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 765 F. Supp. 217, 223-24 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
211See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (territorial limits on effective service of process in district court
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V. PROPOSAL

We have seen that disproportionate collection can be unfair,
that the best solution is an effective right of contribution, and that
neither federal law nor state law currently provides effective
contribution remedies. The solution to disproportionate transferee
collection is to create a federal statutory right of contribution. As
shown in Part III, a right of contribution is a superior approach to
its two alternatives: (1) limiting the Service to proportional
collection or (2) creating a right of indemnity. That right must be
federal because, as shown in Part IVB, state contribution remedies
are unreliable and non-uniform. That right must be statutory
because, as shown in Part IVA, the federal courts are unable to
supply a contribution remedy via either implication from present
law or exercise of common-law authority.
In forging the specifics of such a measure, we have the
precedent of the TBOR2 changes with respect to section 6672.216
TBOR2 provided three main changes: 2 17 (1) TBOR2 section 901 is
a notice requirement: it generally prohibits the Service from
asserting section 6672 liability until 60 days after the Service
notifies the target that it intends to assess the penalty against
him; 218 (2) TBOR2 section 902 requires the Service, if requested in
writing, to disclose to a responsible person the identities of other
persons viewed by the Service as responsible for the same
liability; 21 9 and (3) TBOR2 section 903 creates a contribution right

216 Before TBOR2 was enacted in 1996, there were bar association proposals to similar
effect. See A.B.A. Sec. of Taxation, Tax Section Recommendation 1981-6,34 TAX LAW. 1409
(1981) [hereinafter ABA Proposal]; see also Committee on Personal Income Taxation, supra
note 17. There also are precedents outside the tax context. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(f), 78i(e),
78r(b) (contribution rights under the federal securities laws).
21' There also were changes to ease the threat of § 6672 liability for volunteer board
members of tax-exempt organizations. See TBOR2 § 904 (partially codified at I.R.C. §
6672(e)).
218 Codified at I.R.C. § 6672(b).
21 Codified at I.R.C. § 6103(a)(9).
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for each responsible person with respect to "the excess of the
amount paid by such person over such person's proportionate
share of the [section 6672 liability] .,,220
I propose enactment of a transferee contribution right similar
to that established by TBOR2 for section 6672 but with several
differences. To enhance the efficacy of that new right, I also
propose several complementary rules. The proposed right and its
complements are described below.
A.

Transferee Right of Contribution

Federal tax cases are litigated in four trial forums: the Tax
Court, Court of Federal Claims, Bankruptcy Court, and District
Court.221 However, the Tax Court and the Court of Federal Claims
only hear cases in which the government is a litigant (in the role
of defendant), and there is no good reason to alter that profile.
Thus, jurisdiction to hear the new contribution suits should be
lodged in the district courts, and when proper,
contribution claims
222
could be litigated in the bankruptcy courts.
In either event, the contribution suit would be separate from
any action in which the merits of the Service's transferee liability
assertion against the Burdened Transferee is at issue.
Theoretically, judicial economy might be fostered by having
contribution issues resolved in the same proceeding as the
underlying liability issue. However, transferee liability almost
always is litigated in the Tax Court, so different forums would be
involved. Moreover, joining the matters would produce a more
complex case, so the Service's ability to assess and collect the

I.R.C. § 6672(d).
"' See Steve R. Johnson, The Phoenix and the Perilsof the Second Best: Why Heightened
Appellate Deference to Tax Court Decisions Is Undesirable,77 OR. L. REV. 235, 238-42
(1998).
m
Two instances come to mind. First, if a Windfall Transferee is the debtor in a
bankruptcy case, a Burdened Transferee could assert his contribution right as a claim
against the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 501(a). Second, if the Burdened Transferee is the
debtor, the bankruptcy trustee could assert her contribution right against a Windfall
Transferee as part of the process of marshaling the assets of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. §§
542(b), 544(a).
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transferee liability could be delayed. As argued in Part III(A),
contribution should be a matter among the transferees only and
should not impede collection of taxes due but unpaid. There is a
parallel for this approach. Even those courts which allowed
section 6672 contribution suits before TBOR2 required
unanimously, in order to avoid impeding tax collection, that such
suits be brought separately from the case involving the merits of
the underlying section 6672 liability.223
Venue presents an interesting question. The venue statute
dealing with "collection of internal revenue taxes" 22 4 should not
apply since the contribution action would be collateral to the
Service's assertion of the transferee liability. The general venue
statute for "federal question" cases permits suit: (1) where the
defendants reside if they all reside in'the same state; (2) where "a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the
action is situated;" or (3) as a last resort, where any defendant may
be found.22
Potentially, three problems could arise under this general
statute. First, arguments could arise regarding the substantiality
and relative significance of the various "events and omissions,"
including location of the transferred property, where the transfer
is deemed to have occurred, where tax was paid, and where refusal
to contribute occurred.226 Such arguments, however, are unlikely
to be intractable.
Second, application of the general statute sometimes will
produce a venue convenient for one litigant but inconvenient for
another. However, this possibility always exists. The problem
would be no greater for contribution cases than other classes of
cases, and the remedy lies in general relief mechanisms.227 At

2
See, e.g., Conley v. United States, 773 F. Supp. 1176, 1177 (S.D. Ind. 1991); Padalino
v. United States, 89-2 U.S.T.C. 1 9632 (D.N.J. 1989).
28 U.S.C. § 1396.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
27 For discussion of such factors in another context, see supra note 209 and accompanying
text.
22
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (change of venue).
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least, the hardship would be randomized. Neither Burdened
Transferees as a class nor Windfall Transferees as a class would
be consistently disadvantaged relative to the other class.
Third, a related concern could exist. Assume that the general
statute produced a venue convenient for the alleged Burdened
Transferee but remote from and inconvenient for one or more
Windfall Transferees. A temptation might arise to bring a
contribution action, not because the plaintiff has a sound position,
but because he hopes the distant defendant will settle to avoid
inconvenience or will be handicapped in mounting his defense.
The ABA was sufficiently concerned about this possibility in the
section 6672 context that it suggested that successful defendants
be allowed to recover attorney's fees and costs from the
unsuccessful plaintiffs. 2 8
Congress, however, rejected that suggestion in TBOR2, and
was correct in doing so. Again, this kind of problem would not be
unique in either kind or degree to contribution actions. The
remedy for such abuses is sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, not departing from the usual "American rule"
against cost-shifting. Any residual potential for harassment would
by the salutary effects of a
be, "on balance, outweighed
229
contribution remedy."
The statute of limitations also presents an interesting question.
Since the Service would not be involved in the contribution action,
the normal statute-of-limitations period under the Code 230 would
not apply. There is a five-year "catch all" limitations rule in the
U.S. Code for civil fines and forfeitures. 231 Even if, as is dubious,
that rule were topically relevant, the five-year duration is
excessive to the need at hand. No elaborate discovery should be
necessary; the only issues would be how much each transferee
received from the transferor after the transferor's tax debts arose
and how much each transferee paid to the Service. Further, the

2'
23
21

See Cohen, supra note 188, at *13.
ABA Proposal, supra note 216, at 1412.
I.R.C. §§ 6501, 6511.
28 U.S.C. § 2462.
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more time that passes between the original transfers and the
contribution action, the greater the possibility that the Windfall
Transferees have consumed or dissipated the property they
received. If the Burdened Transferee is to receive more than
theoretical solace, her contribution judgement must be collectible.
The Code prescribes some limitations periods of less than one
year.2 32 A limitations period of one year beginning with the date
the Burdened Transferee makes payment to the Service would
suffice.2 33
B. Complementary Rules
The effectiveness of the new contribution right could be
maximized by correlative procedures. TBOR2 took this approach
with respect to the section 6672 contribution right. One of the
TBOR2 complements, the pre-assessment notice requirement
created by TBOR2 section 901, is unnecessary in our context.
Transferee liabilities are "assessed, paid, and collected in the same
manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations as in
the case of the taxes with respect to which the liabilities were
incurred."234 Typically, income, gift, and estate tax deficiencies
and excise penalty taxes cannot be assessed until the Service
issues a notice of deficiency and judicial review options have been
run their course.23 5 Thus, notice requirements already are
operative in the transferee liability context.
Four other complements would be helpful, though. First, a
nationwide service of process rule should be adopted for transferee
" See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6532(c) (nine-month period for wrongful levy suits by persons other
than the taxpayer), 7429(a)(2), (b)(1) (taxpayer challenging jeopardy or termination
assessment must file request for administrative review within thirty days of being notified
of the assessment and must bring suit within ninety days after actual or constructive
conclusion of administrative review).
The American Bar Association proposed a one-year limitations period with respect to
§ 6672 contribution actions. See ABA Proposal, supra note 216, at 1413, § 1(c)(2). The
Association of the Bar of the City of New York suggested a two-year statute of limitations.
See Committee on Personal Income-Taxation, supra note 17, at 312.
I.R.C. § 6901(a).
2'
See I.R.C. §§ 6212(a), 6213(a). This enumeration substantially overlaps with the types
of taxes covered by § 6901. See I.R.C. § 6901(a).
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liability contribution actions. We saw that whatever contribution
rights may exist now can be cumbersome when transferees are
located in widely separated states.236 There is precedent for
nationwide service of process,237 and its application to the
transferee contribution context would be salutary.
Second, transferees sometimes enter into agreements among
themselves as to how any ensuing liabilities will be apportioned.238
Such consensual arrangements should be encouraged, and a
Burdened Transferee should be held to his bargain. Thus, an
inconsistent agreement should be a defense against proportional
contribution rights otherwise available under the statute.
Third, the thrust of TBOR2 section 902 should be embraced.
The confidentiality rules of the Code usually preclude the release
by the Service of tax return information,239 which includes a
taxpayer's identity, amounts paid, and many other types of
information.240 Section 902 of TBOR2 modified these rules,
permitting the Service to respond to a responsible person's request
for information as to. who the other responsible persons are and
what collection has been effected against them.241
The
confidentiality rules should similarly be modified to permit
Burdened Transferees to obtain from the Service identity and
collection information as to Windfall Transferees. This change
would permit a Burdened Transferee to decide faster and more
accurately whether she should bring a contribution action and, if
so, against whom and for how much. It also would reduce the need
for formal judicial discovery after the contribution suit is filed.
Thus, this change would contribute to efficiency as well as
fairness.242
See supra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.
=7 See 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (interpleader suits).

' See, e.g., Southern Arizona Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 386 F.2d 1002, 1004
(Ct. Cl. 1967).
I.R.C. § 6103(a).
- I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2).
-' See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
242 In spirit, this rule would be compatible with another provision already part of the
Code. See I.R.C. § 6902(b) (giving the transferee special discovery rights as to the "books,
papers, documents, correspondence and other evidence of the taxpayer or a preceding
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Fourth, many transferees have no legal counsel or are
represented by lawyers who do not specialize in tax. Such persons
may be unaware of whatever state contribution rights exist now243
and could be similarly unaware of the new federal statutory
contribution right. Congress could alleviate this problem by
directing the Service to inform persons against whom it makes
transferee liability assessments of the existence of the separate
contribution remedy and the opportunity to request from the
Service information as to other transferees of the transferor. This
would impose some administrative burden on the Service, but that
price would not be excessive compared to the gain in fairness of the
tax system. Indeed, this would only be an extension of a well
precedented approach.
Congress has written many such
"notification of rights" provisions into taxpayer rights legislation. 24
VI. CONCLUSION

Joint-and-several liability is an important device to secure
collection of taxes legitimately owed to the federal government.
However, it can, and often does, lead to unfairness when the
Service collects disproportionately from one of several liable
persons.
Congress, as part of the current taxpayer rights movement, has
addressed this problem in recent years as to two of the three major
areas of joint-and-several liability: section 6672 and joint spousal

transferee" to enable the transferee to determine and litigate whether the transferor was
liable for additional taxes).
2" It is likely that more transferee contribution cases would be brought - though not
necessarily won - in state court but for such lack of knowledge. Cf Levine & Driscoll,
supra note 46, at 36 (citing lack of adequate advice as one reason why responsible persons
fail to protect themselves via indemnification agreements against § 6672 liability).
2" See, e.g., TBOR § 6227 (disclosure of rights of taxpayers); TBOR2 § 403 (disclosure of
collection activities); TBOR3 §§ 1102(b) (codified at I.R.C. § 6212(a)) (notification of right
to contact Taxpayer Advocate's Office), 3401(a) (codified at I.R.C. § 6320(a)(3)) (explanation
of rights upon filing of tax lien), 3401(b) (codified at 6330(a)(3)) (explanation of rights before
levy), 3463(b) (codified at I.R.C. § 6213(a)) (statement in deficiency notice of last date for
filing of Tax Court petition), 3501(b) (explanation of right to spousal relief under I.R.C. §
6015), 3502 (explanation of taxpayer's rights in interviews with Service), 3504 (explanation
of administrative appeal and collection process).
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liability. This aspect of the taxpayer rights agenda will remain
incomplete, however, until the third area, transferee liability, is
addressed as well.
The best solution to unfairness as to disproportionate collection
of transferee liabilities would be establishing a federal statutory
right of contribution. This article has offered suggestions as to
how that right should be structured. Adoption of this approach
would create symmetrical treatment of section 6672 liabilities and
transferee liabilities and would alleviate the unfairness that still
occurs in the latter context.

